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This paper formulates a model of dynamic, endogenous reform of political institutions.
Speciﬁcally, a class of dynamic political games (DPGs) is introduced in which institutional
choice is both recursive and instrumental. It is recursive because future political institutions
are decided under current ones. The process is instrumental because institutional choices do
not aﬀect payoﬀs or technology directly.
DPGs provide a broad framework to address the question: which environments exhibit
institutional reform? Which tend toward institutional stability? In any state, private (public)
sector decisions are essential if, roughly, they cannot always be replaced by decisions in the
public (private) sector. We prove that institutional reform occurs if public sector decisions are
not essential. Conversely, private sector decisions are essential if institutional reform occurs.
The results suggest that a relatively more eﬀective public sector is conducive to institutional
stability, while a more eﬀective private sector is conducive to change. We also show that if the
political rules satisfy a dynamic consistency property, then the game admits “political ﬁxed
points” of a recursive map from future (state-contingent) decisions rules to current ones. Since
existence of political ﬁxed points is a necessary condition of equilibrium, we apply the result
to prove two equilibrium existence theorems, one of which implies that private and public
sector decision rules that are smooth functions of the economic state.
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11 Introduction
Reforms of political institutions are common throughout history. They come in many varieties.
In some cases, the reforms correspond to changes in the voting franchise. Periodic expansions
of voting rights occurred in governments of ancient Athens (700- 338BC), the Roman Republic
(509BC-25AD), and most of Western Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries, to name
just a few examples.1
In other cases, modiﬁcations were made to the voting procedure itself. Medieval Venice
(1032-1300), for instance, gradually lowered the required voting threshold from unanimity
to a simple majority in its Citizens’ Council. Nineteenth century Prussia, where votes were
initially weighted by one’s wealth, eventually equalized the weights across all citizens. The
U.S. changed its rules under the 17th Amendment to require direct election of senators. In still
other instances, the scope of a government’s authority changed. For example, England and
France privatized common land during the 16th and 17th century enclosure movement thus
reducing scope of rules governing the commons.2 The U.S. government, on the other hand,
increased its scope under the 16th Amendment by legalizing federal income tax in 1913.
In many instances, institutional change is gradual and incremental.3 Consequently, this
paper concerns the dynamics of endogenous institutional reform. Which environments tend
toward institutional stability? Which environments admit institutional change? What are the
relevant forces that drive these changes?
To address these questions, we introduce a class of dynamic political games (DPG) in
which the rules for choosing public decisions are themselves part of the decision process. A
dynamic political game (DPG) is an inﬁnite horizon stochastic game in which at each date t,
private and public sector decisions jointly determine the date t + 1 distribution of states of
the world. A state fully describes all the relevant “economic” (i.e., substantive) parameters
and “political” (i.e., procedural) ones at a given point in time. The “political” parameters
then describe the explicit process of political aggregation used to determine public decisions at
that date. The aggregation process is referred to as political rule. If, for example, the current
political rule is a simple majority rule, then the feasible set of outcomes of majority rule is the
set of Condorcet Winners — the choices which cannot be defeated by any alternative choice
1See Fine (1983), Finer (1997), and Fleck and Hanssen (2003).
2See MacFarlane (1978) and Dahlman (1980).
3Consider the progess of reforms in the Roman Republic that gave increasing voice to the plebs (common-
ers). In 509BC, the Senate and Assembly were founded; in 494 BC the Patricians conceded the right of the
plebs (the “commoners”) to participate in the election of magistrates; in 336 BC one of the consulships became
available for election by plebians; and in 287 BC Hortensian Law was introduced which gave resolutions in the
plebian council the force of law. Gradual reform also characterized expantion of voting rights in 19th century
England. In 1830, the voting franchise restricted to 2% of the population. In 1832, the First Reform Act
extended the franchise to 3.5% of population. The Second Reform Act of 1867 extended it to some 7.7%. By
1884 it had been extended to 15% of population. Universal suﬀrage only passed in 1928 (see Finer (1997).
1in a majority vote.
A Markovian equilibrium is a collection of state-contingent private and public sector deci-
sion rules such that (a) the private sector rule for each individual is optimal for him in each
period and in each state, and (b) public sector decisions are consistent with the prevailing
political rule in each period and in each state.
DPGs have two important features. First, the entire institutional design process is recur-
sive; parameters of next period’s political rule are a part of the explicit decision made under
the current political rule. These parameters constitute the “political state” each period. Sec-
ond, the institutional decisions are purely instrumental. That is, they do not aﬀect payoﬀs or
technology directly. Hence, society modiﬁes its existing institutions not because the details of
political procedures enter into the utility functions. Rather, institutions are modiﬁed because
these changes modify substantive private and public sector decisions in the future.
There is a modest literature on dynamic, endogenous political institutions.4 Informal
discussions in North (1981) and Ostrom (1990) both hint at recursivity in the process of insti-
tutional change. In formal work, Messner and Polborn (2002) examine a model of endogenous
changes to future voting rules under current ones in an OLG framework. Lagunoﬀ (2001)
examines a dynamic recursive model of voting over civil liberties.
A number of papers examine dynamic changes in the voting franchise. Seminal work by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001) examines a dynamic game in which a franchised elite
can choose in any period whether to make a once-and-for-all extension of voting rights to the
rest of the population. Since the choice of franchise is a one time decision, only the timing
of the decision matters in their model. Models with gradual and incremental extensions of
the voting franchise were examined by Justman and Gradstein (1999), Roberts (1998, 1999),
Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001), Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003), and Gradstein (2003).
In certain respects, the model in Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003) is a prototype for the present
framework. The dynamics of institutional choices in that model are fully recursive and in-
strumental. The present paper extends the prototype to other institutional choices. At the
same time, the generality of their economic environment is maintained here by allowing fairly
arbitrary types of agent heterogeneity and by avoiding speciﬁc functional forms for payoﬀs
and transition technologies.
Given these features, this paper proves two types of results. First, we characterize con-
ditions under which an equilibrium exhibits institutional reform over time. By deﬁnition, a
reform occurs whenever next period’s political rule is chosen to be diﬀerent than the present
4In focusing attention on dynamic models, I neglect a larger literature on static models of endogenous
political institutions such as, for example, Lizzeri and Persico (2002), and Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2002).
I also neglect the work on inﬁnite regress and self-selection of rules found in Lagunoﬀ (1992), Barbera and
Jackson (2000), Koray (2000).
2one. If the class of political rules satisﬁes a dynamic consistency property, then institutional
reform (alternatively, institutional stability) depends on whether either public or private sec-
tor decisions are essential. Roughly speaking, private (public) sector decisions are said to be
essential if, on a set of states of positive measure, given a social payoﬀ from a political rule and
an alternative private (public) sector decision, one cannot equal or improve upon the social
payoﬀ by varying the public (private) sector decision alone. In other words, private (public)
sector decisions are essential if they cannot be replaced by decisions in the public (private)
sector.
It is proved that reform occurs if public sector decisions are not essential. Conversely,
private sector decisions are essential if political reform occurs. Consider the particular case
of endogenous voting rights. An elite will choose to extend the voting franchise if, under
the existing franchise, policy concessions alone can never “buy oﬀ” the external threat of an
uprising — the private sector decisions. This is, in fact, the crux of an argument by Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000) as to why the voting franchise was extended in 19th century Europe.
Notice that the contrapositive restatement of this result is that the current institution is
stable if private sector decisions are inessential, while public sector decisions are essential if
the current institution is stable. The result therefore implies a crucial distinction between
public and private sector activities. A relatively more eﬀective public sector is conducive to
institutional stability, while a more eﬀective private sector is conducive to change.
A second set of results address the issue of equilibrium existence more generally. A neces-
sary condition is that the implied map from future (state-contingent) decisions rules to current
ones has a ﬁxed point. We refer to this as the political ﬁxed point problem. The problem is
especially acute when political rules are voting rules since voting cycles may arise. Standard
“ﬁxes” such as single peakedness do not work in DPGs because public decisions are inher-
ently multi-dimensional: both the current policy and the future political rule are chosen each
period.
The ﬁndings thus far show that if the political rules satisfy a dynamic consistency property,
then the DPG admits political ﬁxed points. This is proved by showing that the associated
“Bellman’s map” has a ﬁxed point in the space of continuation value functions. An important
special case is the class of all voting rules. If stage game payoﬀs admit an aﬃne representation
then each voting rule is rationalized by the preferences of the median voter in each state.
This aﬃne preference representation is similar to (though more restrictive than) the class of
Intermediate Preferences introduced by Grandmont (1978) to prove a Median Voter theorem
when policies are multi-dimensional. Since these median voter preferences are dynamically
consistent, political ﬁxed points exist under voting rules and aﬃne stage payoﬀs.
In Section 2, we present less formal version of the model in order to highlight some issues
and problems of recursive institutional choice. The general model is described in Section 3.
There, we introduce the class of political rules, and show how political rules are in process
3of recursive institutional choice. A dynamic political game combines both the public and
private sectors of the environment. An “equilibrium” combines standard Markov Perfection
in private decisions with an implementations requirement for public decisions. Section 4
examines the issue of institutional reform. Section 5 examines the political ﬁxed point problem
and describes the existence results more generally. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of
dynamic consistency requirements of the political rules. Proofs of the main results are in the
Appendix, Section 7.
1.1 A Model with Two Political Rules
A less formal, “stripped down” version of the model is presented here to highlight some
basic issues in recursive institutional choice. Consider initially a simple model of period-by-
period majority voting. This is a frequently studied model, and one in which the institutional
environment is ﬁxed.
At each date t =1 ,2,..., a set I = {1,...,n} of individuals must vote to decide a policy pt
at date t. To ﬁx ideas, one can think of pt as an income tax schedule from a set, P, of feasible
schedules. The current state is ωt drawn from a set Ω. One can interpret ωt as the distribution
of incomes across individuals. Since current tax rates may aﬀect savings behavior, the tax rate
aﬀects both one’s current payoﬀ and the future state. For now, omit (notationally) private
sector behavior such as individuals’ savings decisions.
A policy rule ψ is a function specifying the policy pt = ψ(ωt) as a function of state ωt at
date t. Given state ωt, individual i’s (i =1 ,...,n) dynamic payoﬀ over policies is expressed
in a recursive form by
Ui(ωt; ψ)(pt) ≡ ui(ωt,p t)+δ
Z
Vi(ωt+1;ψ)dq(ωt+1| ωt,p t) (1)
where δ is the discount factor, ui is the stage game payoﬀ received in each period, q denotes the
stochastic transition function mapping current states and policies into probability distributions
over future states, and Vi is i’s continuation payoﬀ given policy rule ψ.5
If pt is chosen each period by a simple majority vote, then pairwise comparisons of policy
are evaluated by each individual using his payoﬀ function Ui(ωt;ψ)(·) in (1). The proﬁle of
payoﬀ functions is U(ωt;ψ)=( Ui(ωt;ψ))n
i=1. For each such proﬁle, the outcome of majority
voting is typically represented by the set of Condorcet Winners — outcomes that survive all
pairwise comparisons in a majority vote. Denote this set by C(U(ωt;ψ)). For the policy rule
ψ to be consistent with C(U(ωt;ψ)), it must satisfy the “political ﬁxed point” problem
ψ(ωt) ∈ C(U(ωt;ψ)) , ∀ωt (2)
5The transition q is assumed to satisfy the standard measurability assumptions.
4If voting is cycle proof, then Condorcet Winners exist. But since voting takes place each
period, the continuation payoﬀ Vi already encodes future voting outcomes, and so the voting
rule at date t is cycle-proof only if Condorcet Winners exist in all future dates. In certain
cases, the problem is resolved by assuming that pt is uni-dimensional and then showing that
single peaked stage game preferences generate single peaked recursive preferences. However,
single peakedness will not suﬃce if both the policy and the political institution itself are part
of the decision problem.
Consequently, let θt denote a parameter that determines the political institution. θt is
chosen from a ﬁnite index set Θ. For example, suppose Θ = {θ1,θ 2} where θt = θ1 means that
the tax schedule is determined by a majority vote. By contrast, if θt = θ2 then the tax schedule
is imposed by a “dictator,” whom we assume to be individual i = 1. The “political state”
θt is then distinct from the “economic” state ωt. The latter is directly payoﬀ-relevant. The
former summarizes the political process by which public decisions are made. In particular, the
political state θt determines the political rule, in this case either majority rule or dictatorship,
for choosing both the policy pt and the subsequent political state, θt+1.
As before, ψ determines policy pt. Again, omit the private sector. Now, the public sector
decision includes the choice of institution for the following period. An institutional decision
rule µ is a mapping that determines the future political state θt+1 = µ(ωt,θ t) given the current
economic and political state. The institutional decision rule describes a recursive process of
institutional change. The rule in period t produces the new rule for period t + 1. The public
sector decision each period is a pair (pt,θ t+1).
To save on notation, let st =( ωt,θ t) be the composite state. An individual’s payoﬀ now is
Ui(st; ψ,µ )(pt,θ t+1) ≡ ui(ωt,p t)+δ
Z
Vi(st+1; ψ,µ )dq(ωt+1| ωt,p t) (3)
If st =( ωt,θ 1), then the set C(U(st;ψ,µ ),s t) describes the set of Condorcet Winning
public decisions as before. However, if st =( ωt,θ 2), then C(U(st;ψ,µ ),s t) describes the
public sector decisions that maximize dictator’s payoﬀ function U1(st;ψ,µ )(·). The political
ﬁxed point problem may be restated as
(ψ(st),µ(st)) ∈ C(U(st; ψ,µ ),s t), ∀st (4)
The ﬁxed point problems (2) and (4) are distinct in several respects. In (2), the map
admits a ﬁxed point in the space of policy rules. Since the institution — majority voting —
was ﬁxed, the recursive payoﬀ proﬁles were required to admit Condorcet Winners for each
economic state ω. This is a nontrivial problem by itself. However, the mapping in (4) varies
by institutional state, θt, as well as by economic state ωt, and so we further require that (4)
admits solutions for all such institutions in Θ. Moreover, since the decision problem is multi-
dimensional, the simplest Median Voter Theorems are not useful for solving (4). Finally, if
5private sector decisions are considered, then (4) must hold for individuals’ private decision
rules that best respond to public sector decisions and to each other in all states.
If, indeed, a satisfactory solution to the political ﬁxed point problem is found, this model
can determine when and if institutional change takes place. For instance, when (i.e., for what
values of the economic state ωt) is it true that dictators relinquish power: µ(ωt,θ 2)=θ1?
When is it true that democracies turn over power to dictators: µ(ωt,θ 1)=θ2? The answer will
depend crucially on the interaction between public and private sector decisions. In particular,
without any private sector, we have:
Proposition Let (ψ,µ ) be a political ﬁxed point (a pair that satisﬁes (4) in each state st)
with the property that the Condorcet Winning choice in state θ1 is the most preferred decision
of one of the voters (e.g., a median voter). Then each political state θ ∈ Θ is everywhere
politically stable in the sense that for every ω, µ(ω,θ)=θ.
The proof is a special case of a more general result proved later. The intuition is: by
maintaining the current political state, the current pivotal decision maker (either the dictator
in θ2 or the pivotal voter in θ1) holds on to power. By doing so, the decision problem reduces
to a single agent dynamic programming problem. It is well known in such problems that the
resulting sequence of decisions is optimal from the decision maker’s point of view.
No other individuals make choices to oﬀset the pivotal decision maker’s choices. A private
sector typically ﬁlls that role. Signiﬁcantly, the absence of inalienable rights to make private
decisions is the deﬁning feature of a totalitarian government.6 Consequently, both of these
political rules are stable in a totalitarian state! Since most governments are not totalitarian
to this extreme, we introduce a private sector in the general model that follows.
2 The General Model
2.1 Political Rules
In general, the set Θ can deﬁne a larger set of political institutions than merely “dictator-
ships” and “democracies”. Following standard conventions, we will ﬁnd it useful to drop
time subscripts, and adopt instead the use of primes, e.g., θ0 to denote subsequent period’s
variables, θt+1, and so on. Let S =Ω× Θ denote the composite state space. Let vi denote
an arbitary function expressing the payoﬀ vi(p,θ0) over current policy p and next period’s
political state, θ0. When i’s payoﬀ was a dynamic recursive payoﬀ, as in the previous Section,
6This is the traditional deﬁnition, according to which democracies can be totalitarian if all choices are
ﬁltered through the voting mechanism.
6vi is a notational shorthand, i.e., vi(p,θ0)=Ui(s; ψ,µ )(p,θ0). Let V denote the set of all
proﬁles, v =( v1,...,v n), of such payoﬀ functions.
A class of political rules corresponds to a (possibly empty valued) correspondence
C : V×S →→ P ×Θ∪{∅} that associates to each proﬁle v and to each state s, a set C(v,s)
of public decisions. If (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s), then (p,θ0) is a feasible public decision under C. Each
particular political rule in the class C is given by C(·,s). As a matter of deﬁnition, C may
be empty valued, a possibility which arises quite naturally when C is a class of voting rules.
The class of rules C is single valued if for all v ∈Vand for all s, there exists a (p,θ0) pair such
that C(v,s) ⊆{ (p,θ0)}.
Fix the state s =( ω,θ). To get a better sense of how broadly the framework describes
various political institutions, I sketch a few examples below.
I. Voting over the Voting Rule. The political state identiﬁes the fraction, θ ≥ 1/2
of individuals required to pass a public decision. A supermajority voting rule therefore
determines which supermajority rule is used in the future: formally Θ ⊂ (.5,1] and let
(p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s) if for all (ˆ p, ˆ θ0)
|{i ∈ I : vi(ˆ p, ˆ θ
0) >v i(p,θ
0)}| ≤ θn
II. Voting over the Voting Franchise. The political state θ identiﬁes the subset of
individuals who currently possess the right to vote (the voting franchise). The chosen
public decision is the one that is majority preferred within this restricted group. Each
restricted voting franchise today uses a majority vote to determine what group of indi-
viduals have the right to vote tomorrow: formally, Θ ⊇ 2I, and let (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s) if for
all (ˆ p, ˆ θ0),






In this model, the current voting franchise decides on a new voting franchise in the
following period. An interesting subclass of these rules is the class of Delegated Dic-
tatorship rules. Under these rules, θ varies only over the singletons {i}, i =1 ,...,n.
In each such state, the current dictator chooses his most preferred policy and then del-
egates the decision to possibly a new dictator in the future. If the dates t describes
the length of a generation, then delegated dictator rule might be useful for describing a
particular process of dynastic succession in which the king anoints his own successor.
III. Voting over the Scope of Government. The political state identiﬁes the domain of
public decisions. Let P(θ) denote the set of feasible policies in state θ. Then P = ∪θP(θ).
Let (p,θ0) ∈ C(v,s)i fp ∈ P(θ) and for all (ˆ p, ˆ θ0) satisfying ˆ p ∈ P(θ),






7Numerous “hybrids” can be derived from these (e.g., delegated dictator from a limited
oligarchy). In many (most?) cases, the political rules of interest are those that can rationalized
by some social welfare criterion. Formally, a class of rules C is (partially) rationalized by a
function F :I R





Clearly the Delegated Dictator Rule is rationalized by vθ where θ identiﬁes the dictator. When
the political rule C(·,s) is some type of voting rule (e.g., Examples I and II above), then there
are two well known conditions under which C is rationalized by the preferences of a Median
Voter. The ﬁrst is the standard restriction to single peaked preferences.7 The second is the
order restriction property of Rothstein (1990).8
In the present model, dynamic payoﬀs are of the time separable form, v(pt,θ t+1)=
v1(pt)+δv2(θt+1). In this case, most dynamic models of policy presume a government that
is dynamically consistent in its decision making.9 In the present context, a class of political
rules, C, is said to be dynamically consistent if it is partially rationalized by a welfare function
F that satisﬁes in every state st =( ωt,θ t),
F (v1(pt)+δv2(θt+1),s t)=F (v1(pt),θ t)+δF (v2(θt+1),θ t)
This deﬁnition is standard. However, its signiﬁcance for questions of institutional re-
form/stability is not transparent. The subsequent results all assume dynamic consistency.
In the concluding section, we discuss some potential implications of dynamically inconsistent
aggregation.
2.2 Dynamic Political Games
Recall that I = {1,...,n} is the set of individuals in this society. P is the set of feasible
policies in each period, and S =Ω× Θ is the composite state space. We now introduce
private sector decisions. Let eit denote i’s private decision at date t, chosen from a feasible
set E. A proﬁle of private decisions is et =( e1t,...,e nt ). These decisions may capture any
number of activities, including labor eﬀort, savings, or investment activities. They may also
include “non-economic” activities such as religious worship or one’s participation in a social
revolt. The private sector aﬀects both the stage payoﬀs, as in ui(ωt,e t,p t), and the transition
technology, as in q(·| ωt,e t,p t).
7See Arrow (1951) and Black (1958).
8Similar results can be found in application of single crossing properties by Roberts (1977) and by Gans
and Smart (1996).
9A notable exception is Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002).
8Formally, q(B| ωt,e t,p t) is a probability that ωt belongs to the (Borel measurable) subset
B given the economic state ωt, the private decision proﬁle et, and the policy pt. Given that





t ui(ωt,e t,p t ) (5)












The class of dynamic political games constitutes a broad set of problems in which institu-
tional changes occur endogenously and incrementally. While this includes all the exogenous
elements of the game, the relevant payoﬀ inputs in C are endogenous recursive payoﬀs that
depend on strategies to be deﬁned in the next section. For tractability, we restrict attention
to dynamic political games that satisfy one of the following two exclusive sets of assumptions.
(A1) Θ is a ﬁnite set. P and E are compact, convex subsets of Euclidian spaces, and Ω is
a convex subset of a Euclidian space; the payoﬀ function ui for each i is continuous
and uniformly bounded above by some ¯ u; for each (ω,e,p), q(·| ω,e,p) admits a norm
continuous, conditional density f(·| ω,e,p) with respect to a probability measure η.10
(A1’) E, P and Ω are all ﬁnite sets.
Unless otherwise stated, all the subsequent results assume that either (A1) or (A1’) holds.
2.3 Strategies and Equilibrium
To make the theory tractable, we restrict attention to Markov strategies. Such strategies only
encode the payoﬀ-relevent states of the game. Consequently, individuals are not required to
coordinate on the history of past play.
Recall that ψ : S → P and µ : S → Θ describe the policy and institutional rules,
respectively. A private sector rule for individual i is a function σi : S → Ei that prescribes
10These assumptions are fairly standard Theorems proving existence of Markovian equilibria in the dynamic
games. They are not harmless. In particular, norm continuity of a density f precludes deterministic transitions.
See Dutta (1994) for a cogent discussion of the role of these assumptions.
9private action eit = σi(st) in state st. Let σ =( σ1,...,σ n). The strategy proﬁle is therefore
summarized by the triple
private sector rule
| {z } policy rule
| {z } institutional rule | {z }
π =( σ, ψ, µ )
Together, ψ and µ comprise the public sector rules. An individual deviation from π is
denoted by, for example, π\σi. For any st =( ωt,m t) the payoﬀ to citizen i in proﬁle π at date
t is deﬁned recursively by:
Vi(st; π)=ui(ωt,σ(st),ψ(st))+δ
Z
Vi(ωt+1,µ(st);π)dq(ωt+1| ωt,σ(st),ψ(st) ) (6)
The function V depends on and varies with arbitrary Markov strategy proﬁles π =( σ,ψ,µ ).
Along an equilibrium path (deﬁned below), the function Vi deﬁnes a Bellman equation for
citizen i. Given any strategy π, and any state st at date t, an individual’s public payoﬀ
function Ui(st,π):P × Θ → I R is deﬁned by
Ui(st,π)(pt,θ t+1) ≡ ui(ωt,σ(st),p t)+δ
Z
Vi(ωt+1,θ t+1;π)dq(ωt+1| ωt,σ(st),p t ) (7)
Let U(st,π)=( Ui(st,π)) i∈I (recall that V is the set of payoﬀ proﬁles deﬁned on policies and
future political states, P × Θ). We now drop time subscripts and deﬁne an equilibrium for
any dynamic political game.
Deﬁnition 1 An Equilibrium of a dynamic political game, G, is a proﬁle π =( σ,ψ,µ )o f
Markov strategies such that for all states s =( ω,θ),
(a) Private decision rationality: For each citizen i, and each private decision rule, ˆ σi,
Vi(s; π) ≥ Vi(s; π\ˆ σi ) (8)
(b) Public decision implementation: The public decision pair (ψ(s),µ(s) ) satisﬁes
(ψ(s),µ(s)) ∈ C (U(s,π),s) (9)
According to (a), in each state, s, private sector actions are individually optimal. According
to part (b), public sector decisions are consistent with political rules in the class C. In keeping
with the standard deﬁnition of a stochastic game, both types of decisions are simultaneous.
Therefore, an equilibrium of a DPG requires both Markov Perfection from individuals’ private
sector choices and recursive consistency of public sector choices with a political rule. The latter
requirement must hold in each state s, and so the consistency condition also satisﬁes kind of
“perfection constraint.”
103 When Does Institutional Reform Occur?
By institutional reform is meant the simple idea that institutions are deliberately modiﬁed.
Hence, institutional reform occurs in state st whenever µ(ωt,θ t) 6= θt+1. A fundamental
question is when and whether institutional reform occurs. The answer depends, in part, on
whether private and public sector decisions are essential.
Fix the political state θ. Formally, we will say that private sector decisions are essential
in θ if, on a positive measure set11 of economic states, ω, there exists a pair (e,p) of private
and policy decisions, a uniformly bounded measurable function x :Ω→ IR
n, and a private















0|ω,ˆ e, ˆ p),θ
￿
(10)
Private sector decisions will be said to be inessential in θ if they are not essential in θ.I n
words, private decisions are essential if there is a feasible social payoﬀ (the left-hand side of
(10)), and an alternative private section proﬁle ˆ e for which no policy can produce an alternative
social payoﬀ using the same continuation x such that the alternative social payoﬀ matches or
exceeds the original social payoﬀ. Essentially, this means that the eﬀect of at least one private
sector decision cannot be replaced by any of those of the public sector.
If, for example, maxe,p F is always single valued, then the private sector is essential. An
extreme case was illustrated earlier: when there is no private sector (the totalitarian state),
then private decisions are, by deﬁnition, inessential. In general, anytime there is redundancy
between public provision or private provision of a good — the private sector is inessential.
This suggests that “essentiality” is a generic property. However, it is doubtful whether math-
ematical genericity is relevant here since redundancy, in this context, is partly an artifact of
property rights arrangements. As such, it could be built into the political process itself. For
example, if both the public and private sectors produce widgets using the same technology,
then neither sector is essential if consumers have no inherent preference for where the good is
produced.
An analogous deﬁnition exists for policy decisions. We will say that policy decisions are
essential in state θ if, on a positive measure set of economic states, ω, there exists a (e,p),
a uniformly bounded measurable function x :Ω→ IR
n, and any alternative policy decision
proﬁle ˆ p, such that for any Nash equilibrium private sector proﬁle ˆ e of the game with payoﬀs,
u(ω,ˆ e, ˆ p)+δ
R
x(ω0)dq(ω0|ω,ˆ e, ˆ p), the Inequality (10) holds.
Theorem 1 Consider a dynamic political game in which C is a single valued, dynamically
consistent class of political rules. Fix a state s =( ω,θ).L e tπ =( σ,ψ,µ ) be an equilibrium
11...using the probability measure η from (A1).
11that is unique up to the given policy rule ψ.12 If institutional reform occurs in state s =( ω,θ)
(i.e., , µ(ω,θ) 6= θ), then private sector decisions are essential in θ. Conversely, if public
sector decisions are inessential in θ, then institutional reform occurs in state s.
The result uniﬁes a number of results in the literature on progressive expansion of voting
rights. Under the external conﬂict explanation (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)), the
voting franchise was extended by an elite to head oﬀ social unrest. This conforms to a case in
which public decisions are inessential under the restricted franchise — they can be undercut
by the threat of revolt. Under the internal conﬂict explanation, rights are extended to gain
support when there is ideological or class conﬂict among the elite. A special case appears in
Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2003).13 They construct an example in which taxes sustain investment
in public literacy. Conﬂict between the median voter within the elite, and the population
median individual’s private investment in literacy leads to an expansion of voting rights.14
If institutional reform does not occur, then the current institution could be said to be
stable. Consequently, one could express the result, in shorthand, as either
public sector never essential ⇒ institutional reform ⇒ private sector sometimes essential
or, equivalently,
private sector never essential ⇒ institutional stability ⇒ public sector sometimes essential
Phrased in this way, the result suggests an eﬀective public sector is conducive to institutional
stability, while an eﬀective private sector is conducive to change.
Unfortunately, the result does not apply to the most interesting cases, those that are
intermediate. In these cases, both private and public decisions are essential some of the time.
Reform then entails a balance between public and private sector eﬀects. We oﬀer no formal
results on this, but the intuition above suggests that reform (or stability) may depend on
the relative likelihood of states that sustain essential private sector decisions versus the states
that sustain essential public sector decisions. In turn, this relative likelihood depends on the
current state and current decisions. Hence, the process might exhibit natural hysteresis.15
12That is, there does not exist another equilibrium π∗ =( σ∗,ψ,µ ∗) with the same policy rule ψ.
13Internal conﬂict of a somewhat related type is found in Lizzeri and Persico (2002).
14Public investment is not essential when the franchise is too narrow, because the elite’s chosen tax rate is
too small to induce much private eﬀort from the population.
15In a dynamic model of endogenous voting rights, Roberts (1999) generates endogenous hysteresis in the
size of the voting franchise. The source of Roberts’ hysteresis is quite diﬀerent than what is contemplated
here. In that model, there is no private sector, and payoﬀs vary directly with franchise decisions. Instead
hysteresis comes from the single crossing structure between the economic state and the political state.
124 The Political Fixed Point Problem
Establishing existence of equilibria in dynamic political games is a nontrivial exercise. Roughly
speaking, there are two main problems with establishing a ﬁxed point of this map. First, there
is the “standard” problem expressed by part (a) in the equilibrium deﬁnition. For even if there
were no public decisions (or if C was constant in all states), known existence results generally
employ restrictive conditions on feasible choice sets, preferences, and transition technology.
Second, there political ﬁxed point problem expressed here in part (b) of the deﬁnition.
Strictly speaking, the two problems cannot be separated. However, for conceptual reasons, it
is useful to maintain the distinction. Given σ,apolitical ﬁxed point is a pair (ψ,µ ) that solves
(9).
The following two results are proved in the Appendix. Both make use of either Assumption
(A1) or (A1’). The ﬁrst Lemma asserts that dynamic consistency of the political rule is
suﬃcient for political ﬁxed points to exist.
Lemma 1 Suppose in a dynamic political game G, the political rule C is dynamically consis-
tent. Then for any private decision rules, σ, the game admits political ﬁxed points.
The next result identiﬁes a simple restriction on stage game payoﬀs — a restriction similar
to Grandmont’s (1978) Intermediate Preference assumption — that suﬃces for voting rules to
be dynamic consistent. Under this restriction, any voting rule admits a political ﬁxed point.
Lemma 2 Suppose that in a dynamic political game G, the stage game payoﬀs admit the
aﬃne preference representation,
ui(ω,e,p)=k(i)h(ω,e,p)+g(ω,e,p) (11)
all i, where k is an increasing, real valued function. If C is a voting rule, then C is dynamically
consistent.
Unfortunately, even with aﬃne stage game preferences, a solution to the general existence
problem is not guaranteed. To do that will require that institutional rules be extended to
mixed strategies. This is taken up in the next two Subsections.
4.1 Extension to Mixed Strategies: A Simple Existence Theorem
The simplest way to resolve the existence issue is to assume that all sets, E, P, Ω and Θ are
ﬁnite (Assumption (A1’) ) and extend the analysis to mixed strategies and or lotteries. The
13extension is fairly straightforward with one exception. Since the political rule C makes a joint
determination of p and θ0, it must be extended to the set of correlated distribution (lotteries),
∆(P × Θ).
Formally, we represent the public sector decision rule on p and θ0 as a pair ψ∗ and µ∗ such
that µ∗ : S → ∆(θ) where µ∗(θ0|s) is the probability of θ0 given s, and ψ∗ : S×Θ → ∆(P) where
ψ∗(p|s,θ0) denotes the conditional probability of p given s and the realized θ0. The associate
mixed action is expressed as ψ∗ × µ∗. Finally, the σ∗
i (ei|s) is the conditional probability of
private decision ei given s.
Let π∗ =( σ∗,ψ∗ × µ∗) denote a proﬁle of mixed Markov strategies. The payoﬀ (6) is















Theorem 2 For any dynamic political game, G, satisfying (A1’), suppose that the political
rule C is dynamically consistent. Then there exists an equilibrium π∗ =( σ∗,ψ∗ × µ∗) in
possibly mixed Markov strategies.
In the particular case of a voting rule, equilibria exist if stage game preferences admit
aﬃne representations.
Notice that since F is dynamically consistent, then for any political state θ, we can treat
the social welfare function F(·,θ) in state θ as a player in a standard dynamic game whose
feasible pure actions from the set P × Θi fθ is the current state, and are from the set ∅ if θ







Viewed in this way, the DPG can be transformed into a standard, ﬁnite stochastic game with
n + |Θ| players. At this point, the Theorem 2 is just an application of a standard result,
namely, that stochastic games with ﬁnite actions sets and ﬁnite states admit (possibly mixed
strategy) Markov Perfect equilibria. We therefore ommit remainder of the proof.
4.2 A Smooth Existence Theorem
While the ﬁnite existence theorem is useful in many contexts, it is limited in a number of
ways. First, it does not address existence in many economically relevant environments. In
14many models of economic interest, the economic states are unboundedly inﬁnite, e.g., capital
stocks.
Second, practical applications demand more structure. For example, Klein, Krusell, and
Rios-Rull (2002)develop techniques for solving Euler equations politico-economic models of
time consistent government policy. These are hybrid models in which private decisions aggre-
gate through a price system. Their techniques allow one to estimate optimal policy functions
that result from median voter and other political rules. These techniques can be partially
adapted to complete, dynamic game environments, but only if Markovian equilibria exist and
are diﬀerentiable in the economic states. Hence, a theory of dynamic institutional design
has more immediate relevance, from an applied perspective, if it admits smooth Markovian
equilibria.
An recent result of Horst (2003) asserts existence of Lipschitz-continuous, hence, almost
everywhere smooth, Markovian equilibria in dynamic games. His results makes use of a
“moderate social inﬂuence” assumption whereby, one’s own actions have a relatively greater
eﬀect on one’s own marginal dynamic payoﬀ than those of all other individuals combined.16
We adapt elements of his result, including the moderate social inﬂuence assumption, to show
that dynamic political games with dynamically consistent rules admit equilibria that are
diﬀerentiable in the economic state, ω.
To make sense of formal assumptions, we adopt the following deﬁnitions and notational
conventions.
First, we endow the class of (smooth) C∞ functions with the topology of C∞-uniform
convergence on compacta. Formally, Hm → H in this topology if, for any compact set K,
Hm converges to HC ∞-uniformly on K (i.e., for each r and each rth partial derivative,
||DrHm − DrH||r → 0o nK).17
Next, deﬁne a real valued function, g :I R




Finally, given ￿, we let E￿ and P ￿ denote interior neighborhoods of E and P, respectively,
such that any point e ∈ E￿ or p ∈ P ￿ is ￿ in distance away from the respective boundaries in
E and P.
16A similar condition is found in a local interaction model of Horst and Scheinkman (2002).
17The sup norm, || · ||r on the rth derivative DrH :I R
` → IR









In this notation, || · ||0 is the standard sup norm on H.
18An equivalent deﬁnition is: g is α-concave if the matrix D2g +αI, with I denoting the identity matrix, is
negative semi-deﬁnite.
15In addition to Assumption (A1), the following assumptions on the dynamic political game
will be used.
(A2) For each i, the payoﬀ function ui is smooth, uniformly bounded above by K>0 and
is C∞-uniformly bounded by L>K .19 Furthermore, there is an αi > 0 such that ui is
αi-concave in the policy and private decision pair, (ei,p) pair, for each ω.
(A3) The conditional density f(·| ω,e,p), with respect q, is norm continous in the variables
(ω,e,p), and there is an M>0 such that for each ω0 and each ω, f(ω0| ω,·) is assumed
to be C∞-uniformly bounded by M.
(A4) There exists a 0 <γ<1 such that for all i, and all s =( ω,θ),
(1 − δ)Li + δKM
αi
≤ γ(1 − δ).
(A5) There exists an ￿>0 such that that for each each i, each e−i, each p, and each pair of
economic states ω and ω0, both ui(ω,e−i,·), and f(ω0|ω,·) achieve their upper bounds
on E￿ × P ￿.
Assumptions (A2) and (A3) are standard technical conditions, although the norm conti-
nuity of f is restrictive. It rules out, for instance, deterministic transitions. Assumption (A4)
is the Moderate Social Inﬂuence (MSI) assumption adapted from (Horst, 2003) and Horst
and Scheinkman (2002). Assumption (A5) ensures interior solutions. There can be no best
responses at on boundaries of E or of E × P.
Theorem 3 Let G a dynamic political game satisfying (A1)-(A5). Suppose the political rule
C is dynamically consistent. Then G admits an equilibrium, π =( σ,ψ∗ ×µ∗), in which σ and
ψ∗(·|·,θ 0) are pure strategies that are smooth in the state ω.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines questions of institutional reform. It introduces a dynamic recursive
framework in which the political institution is an instrumental object of choice each period.
We show that reform depends on whether private or public sector decisions are essential.
The intuition from the “essentiality” result suggests that reform (or stability) may depend
on the relative likelihood of states that sustain essential private sector decisions versus the
19A function H :I R
` → IR
k,i sC∞-uniformly bounded if it is smooth and there is some some ﬁnite number
L>0 that uniformly bounds H and bounds all its higher order derivatives in sup norm.
16states that sustain essential public sector decisions. Hence, the “intermediate” environments
where both public and private sector decisions are sometimes essential is an obvious focal
point for future work.
In general, dynamic, recursive models of political aggregation are not new. One of the
ﬁrst is the pioneering work of Krusell, Quadrini, and R´ ıos-Rull (1997). More recent examples
include Klein, Krusell, and R´ ıos-Rull (2002) and Hassler, et. al. (2003).20 In this literature
the institution itself is ﬁxed. Usually, some form of majority voting is assumed, and so the
“political ﬁxed point” problem outlined above can be resolved in certain cases when the policy
space is single dimensional.
A few papers examine dynamic models of voting that speciﬁcally allow for multi-dimensional
choice spaces (though keeping the voting mechanism ﬁxed). These include Bernheim and
Nataraj (2002), Kalandrakis (2002), and Banks and Duggan (2003).
The present framework in necessarily multi-dimensional. The political ﬁxed point problem
is compounded by fact that diﬀerent institutions each have possibly distinct requirements
achieving recursive consistency. Nevertheless, under certain conditions, the problem is resolved
when political rules are dynamically consistent.
A strong case can be made that many if not most political rules observed in the world
today are, in fact, dynamically inconsistent. Two sources of dynamic inconsistency are of
particular interest. First, dynamically inconsistent choices arise because the political rules
vary with economic states such as the income distribution. Arguably, modern ﬁnancing of
political campaigns has this property. A purer example of this is the wealth-is-power rule
examined by Jordan (2002). In its simplest incarnation, policies are entirely determined by
those with the most aggregate wealth. We deﬁne a slight variant as follows.
IV. Wealth-is-Power vs Dictatorship Let the economic state determine distribution of
wealth, i.e, ω =( ω1,...,ω n). Let Θ = {θa,θ b} where θa is the dictatorship by individual







where M = {i ∈ I : vi(ˆ p, ˆ θ0) >v i(p,θ0)}. The state θb deﬁnes wealth-is-power rule
under which policies are entirely determined by those with the most aggregate wealth.
Jordan (2002) shows that outcomes of the wealth-is-power rule correspond to the core of
a certain cooperative game. He characterizes the set of wealth distributions that generate
nonempty core, or in our context, generate political ﬁxed points. The wealth-as-power rule
20See Persson and Tabellini (2001) for other references.
17may possibly be unstable even if private decisions are inessential. A wealthy individual other
than Player 1 may wish to switch to θa and, consequently, commit all decision authority to
Player 1 as a “hedge” against more egalitarian wealth distributions which might arise in the
future. It is worth noting that some have argued that unrestricted private funding of political
campaigns would induce outcomes similar to those of the wealth-is-power rule.
A second form of dynamic inconsistency arises because the political rules are not time
separable. An example is a weighted Rawlsian social choice rule under which society wishes
to maximize the welfare of the person whose weighted payoﬀ makes him least well oﬀ.









It is not generally true that the least well oﬀ individual today also has the least well oﬀ
continuation payoﬀ next period. Hence, the political rule may choose a diﬀerent weighting
scheme in the following period, even if it involves a concession of decision authority in the
future.
Under both types of inconsistencies, political reform could arise as a commitment against
an institution’s “future self.” If the private sector is inessential, then the institution’s own
future self is possibly less trustworthy than that of another institution. A reform then occurs.
However, if a private sector is essential, then the alternative institution’s future self may be
less trustworthy. That case could result in the stability of a dynamically inconsistent rule.
6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 Fix a dynamic political game, a state s =( ω,θ), and an equilibrium
π =( σ,ψ,µ ) all satisfying the hypothesis of the Theorem.
Since C is single valued and dynamically consistent, there is some social criterion F that
rationalizes C and is invariant to the economic states ω. By deﬁnition,




F(V (s;π),θ)=F(U(s;π)(ψ(s),µ(s)),θ) ≥ F(U(s;π)(p,θ
0),θ), ∀(p,θ
0) (13)
Suppose ﬁrst that private decisions are not essential on a set of states s0 =( ω0,θ) with
full measure. This means that for all such states, for all pairs (e,p), all bounded measurable
18function x :Ω→ IR
n, and all private sector proﬁlea ˆ e, there exists a policy ˆ p, which violates












































































Hence, we have shown that a pair (ψ,µ ) in which µ(ω,θ)=θ is a solution to
maxp,˜ θ F(U(ω,θ;π)(p, ˜ θ),θ). But because C is single valued, it is the only such solution. We
therefore conclude that nonessentiality of private decisions implies no political reform.
Now suppose the equilibrium is such that µ(ω,θ)=θ, i.e, no political reforms occur in
state s. Then (15) holds whenever p = ψ(ω,θ) and e = σ(ω,θ). Consequently, there is at








19By dynamic consistency of F, this means



















































with one of the inequalities in (17) strict.
Letting x(·)=V (·,µ(ω0, ˆ θ);π) notice that σ(ω0, ˆ θ) is a Nash equilibrium in private actions
of the stage game with payoﬀs
u(ω
0,e,ψ(ω







By assumption this Nash equilibrium is unique given the ﬁxed policy rule ψ. Hence, we have




























Since F (x(·),θ) is also a bounded measurable function of the state, Inequality (18) proves
that public policy decisions are essential.
Proof of Lemma 1
Let W : S → IR
n be a proﬁle of bounded, measurable continuation payoﬀ functions. We
call a continuation function W feasible if W = V (·,π) for some strategy proﬁle, π. Let W
denote the set of feasible continuations. By a slight abuse of our previous notation, we deﬁne








We prove ﬁrst that political ﬁxed points are associated with the ﬁxed points (in value
function) of the associated Bellman’s mapping. Speciﬁcally, let G be a dynamic political
20game in which rule C is partially rationalized by a function F. For each σ ∈ Σ, suppose that




p,θ0 F (U(s; σ,W)(p,θ
0),s ) (21)
Then we show that the pair ( ˆ ψ,ˆ µ) that solves (21) when W = ˆ W is a political ﬁxed point.
To see this, ﬁx σ and let ˆ W be a ﬁxed point of the Bellman’s operator deﬁned in (20). Let







U(s; σ, ˆ W)(ˆ ψ(s), ˆ µ(s)),s
￿
, ∀s
By our earlier (abuse of) notation, U(s; σ, ˆ W)=U(s; σ, ˆ ψ,ˆ µ). If C is either partially or fully
rationalized by F, then ( ˆ ψ,ˆ µ) ∈ C(U(s; σ, ˆ ψ, ˆ µ, s), and so ( ˆ ψ,ˆ µ) is a political ﬁxed point.
Next, we prove that if C is fully rationalized by F, then the converse holds: namely, for
every political ﬁxed point ( ˆ ψ, ˆ µ), the corresponding value ˆ W of the Bellman’s operator is a
ﬁxed point of (20). Suppose then that C is fully rationalized by F and let ( ˆ ψ,ˆ µ) be a political
ﬁxed point. Then
(ˆ ψ, ˆ µ) ∈ C(U(s;σ, ˆ ψ,ˆ µ),s ) = argmax
p,θ0 F
￿
U(s; σ,V (·;σ, ˆ ψ, ˆ µ))(p,θ
0),s
￿
By deﬁnition, V (·;σ, ˆ ψ,ˆ µ) is a ﬁxed point of the Bellman operator.
We prove the remainder of the result as follows. Fix an arbitrary σ and let W be any
bounded continuation proﬁle, and by our abuse of notation, write U(s,σ,W). Since C is
















Notice that under either (A1) or (A1’), (BW) in nonempty valued. It is easy to very that
B satisﬁes two suﬃcient conditions, discounting and monotonicity, in a well known result
of Blackwell (1965), implying that B is a contraction. Applying the Contraction Mapping
Theorem, B has a ﬁxed point, ˆ W. By our previous argument relating ﬁxed points in value
space with those in strategy space, the conclusion follows.



































Clearly, the continuation proﬁle V (·,π) has an aﬃne representation of the same form as
















The proﬁle U(s,π) has also has an aﬃne representation. Because k is strictly increasing,
the proﬁle U(s,π) is order restricted with respect to linear order on i induced by k (i.e., i ￿ j
iﬀ k(i) >k (j)). By the Median Voter Theorem of Rothstein (1990), since C is a voting rule, C
is partially rationalized by the function corresponding to the recursive preferences Um, of the
individual m for whom k(m) is the median (individual m is the “median voter”). Formally,
argmax
p,θ0 Um(s,π)(p,θ
0) ⊆ C(U(s,π),s) (23)
Given either Assumption (A1) or Assumption (A1’), the left hand side of (23) has a solution.
Proof of Theorem 3 We ﬁrst prove an existence Theorem without public decisions.
That is, consider the standard dynamic game with only private decisions, ei. In what follows,
we exclude the public decision component from notation altogether. That is, we ﬁrst assume
that stage game payoﬀs are given by ui(ω,e) while the density is given by f(ω0| ω,e). Let
¯ G = h(ui)i∈I,Ω,q,E,ω 0;i denote the game with only private decisions. Restating the result,
we ﬁrst wish to prove
Theorem A Let ¯ G denote a dynamic game with only private decisions. Suppose ¯ G satisﬁes
(A1)-(A5). Then the game has a Markov Perfect equilibrium σ that is smooth on Ω.
22Let X denote the set of all uniformly bounded, Lipschitz continuous functions, x :Ω→
[0,c]n with uniform Lipschitz bound given by maxi Li. Standard results show that X is
compact in the topology of uniform convergence on compacta (see, for example, Mas Colell
(1985, Theorem K.2.2). For each such function x ∈X, deﬁne a one shot game by the payoﬀs,





for each i. Then let H =( Hi)n
i=1 be the vector valued function with components deﬁned by
(24).
Lemma 3 For each state ω and each continuation value x ∈X , the one shot game deﬁned
by payoﬀ proﬁle, H(ω,·,x ), has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium proﬁle,
(¯ σ1(ω,x),...,¯ σn(ω,x))
of private decisions. The proﬁle ¯ σ is smooth with uniformly bounded ﬁrst derivatives in ω,
and is uniformly bounded and continuous in x.
Proof of Lemma 3
Observe, ﬁrst, that by Assumptions (A2) and (A3), for each i, Hi is a smooth and C∞-
uniformly bounded function of (ω,e) (in the relative topology), with uniform bound given
by
(1 − δ)Li + δcM (25)
Clearly, this bound is independent of x since x is itself uniformly bounded by c. Consequently,
Hi is uniform bounded on its entire domain.
Next, we show that for each state ω, Hi is ¯ αi-concave in ei where ¯ αi = −(1−δ)αi+δcM > 0.
To show this, we must show that for each ω, D2
eiHi(ω,¯ ex )+¯ αiI is negative semi deﬁnite.
To this end, ﬁx ω. Observe that by α-concavity on stage utility functions, ui, and uniform
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￿
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23Since, by Assumption (A4), ¯ αi > 0, it follows that Hi is ¯ α-concave. Consequently, by




for each i is nonempty and single valued.
Consider the best response function, gi. By the Assumption (A5), gi(ω,e−i,x) deﬁnes a
critical point, i.e.,
DeiHi(ω,gi(ω,e−i,x),e −i,x)=0 .
Then by strict concavity of Hi, the Implicit Function Theorem implies that gi is a locally
smooth function in a neighborhood of (ω,e−i) (in the relative topology). In this neighborhood,





Given the C∞-uniform bound on Hi given by (25), the ¯ αi-concavity of Hi implies that there is
a uniform bound on Dgi given by 1
¯ αi(1 − δ)Li +δcM. Finally, since the choice of (ω,e−i)w a s
arbitrary, every such point is a regular point and so gi is everywhere smooth with uniformly
bounded ﬁrst derivative.
We now show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium, ¯ σ(ω,x) of the game with payoﬀs,
H(ω,·,x). Fixing, ω and x, consider the best response map
e 7→ (g1(ω,e−1,x),...g n(ω,e−n,x))
by the arguments above, the conditions for Brouwer’s Theorem are met and so this map has
a ﬁxed point. Since all best responses are interior — as shown above — the ﬁxed point must
be an interior point in En. To verify that this ﬁxed point is unique, it suﬃces to show that
the best response diﬀerence map
e 7→ e − (g1(ω,e−1,x),...g n(ω,e−n,x) ) (26)
has no critical points. It suﬃces then to show that the Jacobian of this map at diﬀerentiable
points is nonsingular. In turn, the Jacobian is nonsingular if it has a dominant diagonal. The
Jacobian has a dominant diagonal if
||De−igi||1 < 1, ∀i, (27)
at points (ω,e−i,x) of the best response map, gi. To verify (27), consider the best response
map, gi. Then we have:

















(1 − δ)Li + δcM
< 1
(28)
The ﬁrst equality is the Implicit Function Theorem,21 the ﬁrst inequality follows from the
deﬁnition of ¯ α-concavity, the second follows from the bounds assumed by (A2) and (A3), and
the last follows from the MSI condition (A4).
Next, we show that the proﬁle ¯ σ is smooth with uniformly bounded ﬁrst derivatives in
ω with the bound uniform across all x as well. Observe that the nonsingularity of (26)
implies that the unique Nash equilibrium ¯ σ(ω,x) is implicitly deﬁned by the Implicit Function
Theorem. In turn, the IFT also implies that Dω¯ σ is smooth and deﬁned by
Dω¯ σ =[ Deg]
−1[Dωg]
Note that the inverse [Deg]−1 exists and is uniformly bounded over all ω and all x by the
dominance diagonal condition, (28). Consequently, Dω¯ σ exists everywhere and is uniformly
bounded over all ω and x.
Finally, we now prove that σ is Lipschitz continuous in x with uniform Lipschitz constant.
This follows from a result of Montrucchio (1987, Theorem 3.1) and later restated by Horst
(2003, Theorem A1). In particular, their result implies that for each i, each ω, and any pair
x,x0,
||gi(ω,·,x) − gi(ω,·,x
0)||0 <γ ||x − x
0||0 (29)
where γ is the MSI bound in Assumption (A4). Using the diﬀerence map in (26) to deﬁne
the ﬁxed points, the Implicit Function Theorem again implies that (29) applies to the ﬁxed
point, ¯ σ, as well.
Using Lemma 3, let ¯ σ be the map that deﬁnes the unique Nash equilibrium ¯ σ(ω,x) for the
one shot game with payoﬀs, Hi(ω,e,x),i=1 ,...,n.









, ∀j 6= i
25Lemma 4 The equilibrium payoﬀ function Hi(·, ¯ σ(·),x) is smooth with a uniformly bounded
ﬁrst derivative in ω, and with the uniform bound applying across all x.
Proof of Lemma 4 By deﬁnition,




0| ω,¯ σ(ω,x)) dη
The smoothness therefore follows from the smooth of H in ω directly and from the smooth-
ness of ¯ σ(ω,x)i nω established in Lemma 3. The uniform boundedness of ﬁrst derivatives in ω
follows from the C∞-uniform boundedness of H and the uniform boundness of ﬁrst derivatives
of ¯ σ established in Lemma 3.
Lemma 5 Let {x`} be a sequence such that x` ∈Xfor all ` and x` → x ∈Vwith the
convergence uniform on each compact set K ⊂ Ω as ` →∞ . Then for each ￿ there exists a ¯ `



















Proof of Lemma 5 See Horst (2003, Lemma 5.2).
Now deﬁne the operator, T deﬁned on X n by
(Tx)i(ω)=Hi(ω,¯ σ(ω,x),x)
for each i =1 ,...,n, or, in other words,
(Tx)(ω)=( H1(ω,¯ σ(ω,x),x),...,H n(ω,¯ σ(ω,x),x) ) (30)
Clearly, from Lemma 4, the function (Tx)(·) is smooth in ω with uniformly bounded ﬁrst
derivative in ω over all ω and x. This implies, in particular, that Tx has uniform Lipschitz
bound. Consequently, Tx∈Xfor all V ∈X. Hence, we have T : X n →Xn.
Lemma 6 T is a continuous operator.
Proof Lemma 6 Let {x`} be a sequence such that x` ∈Xfor all ` and x` → x ∈Xwith the
convergence uniform on each compact set K ⊂ Ωa s` →∞ . By Lemma 4, we also know that
by Lipschitz continuity of ¯ σ in x, ||¯ σ(·,x `)−¯ σ(·,x)|| → 0 uniformly in ω. Consequently, by the
26smoothness properties of ui for each i and of f we can ﬁx ￿>0 and let ¯ ` satisfy for all ` ≥ ¯ `, all
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< (1 − δ)￿ + δ￿ = ￿
Hence T is continuous.
The Rest of the Proof of Theorem A
Using Lemma 6, T maps continuously from the compact set X into X. By Schauder’s




Therefore, the proﬁle, σ∗ deﬁned by σ∗ ≡ σ(·,x ∗) is a Markov Perfect equilibrium of the
dynamic political game without public decisions.
The Extension to Public Decisions
Fix a dynamic political game G satisfying (A1)-(A5) and C dynamically consistent. We
now deﬁne a simple transformation of the full game, G, with public decisions to one with
private decisions game ¯ G such that ¯ G = h(¯ uj)j∈J, ¯ Ω, ¯ q, ¯ E,ω0;i and the Markov Perfect equi-
librium of transformed game with private decisions is an equilibrium of the original dynamic
political game.
First, deﬁne the state space in the private decisions game to be ¯ Ω=Ω× Θ, as expected.
Next, observe that since C is dynamically consistent, the set of players in ¯ G is J = I. Use j to
index this set. Now reinterpret public decisions in the original game G as private decisions in
the private action game, ¯ G, as follows. For each θ, let ¯ Ej(θ) denote the feasible actions given
27θ. Deﬁne ¯ Ej(θ)=E if j ∈ I, and ¯ Ej(θ)=P × ∆(Θ) if j = θ, and ¯ Ej(θ)={p◦} otherwise,
where p◦ is a degenerate action.
For a player j = θ, a part of his decision is a mixed action in ∆(Θ), which we denote by
βθ. Hence, βθ(θ0) is the probability assigned by player j = theta to θ0.
Deﬁne the stage payoﬀs, ¯ u by:
¯ ui(ω,θ,¯ e)=ui(ω,e,p)i ﬀ¯ eθ =( p,βθ), and ¯ ei = ei,∀i ∈ I





0)i ﬀ¯ eθ =( p,β), and ¯ ei = ei,∀i ∈ I
Now ﬁx a realization θ0 of next period’s political state. Implicitly, this means that we
ignore the mixed strategies (βθ)θ∈Θ. Observe then that the restriction of ¯ ui and ¯ f to the
remaining variables of the game satisﬁes (A1)-(A5). Consequently, Theorem A implies that
a Markov Perfect equilibrium, call it ¯ σ∗ exists which depends on the realized θ0. We write
¯ σ∗(ω,θ,θ 0) to denote the action proﬁle condition on the state (ω,θ) and the realization θ0 from
the mixed strategies (βθ)θ∈Θ. By Theorem A, ¯ σ∗ is smooth in the economic state ω.
Now ﬁx this ¯ σ∗. Observe that since βθ does not vary with the economic state, we can now
consider the choice of (βθ) as a mixed Markov strategy proﬁle in a ﬁnite state, ﬁnite action
dynamic game. Application of Theorem 2 implies the existence of an equilibrium proﬁle (βθ).
Since (βθ) and ¯ σ∗ are chosen as if they are sequenced, we can deﬁne a corresponding correlated
public decision rule ψ∗ × µ∗ in the original game by:
p = ψ∗(ω,θ,θ 0)=¯ σ∗
θ(ω,θ,θ 0)
µ∗(θ0|ω,θ)=βθ(θ0|ω,θ)
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